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Abstract:  
 
The aim of this paper is to explain Australian R&D capitalisation and voluntary disclosure.  It 
is argued that the discretionary choices available to management in Australia with respect to 
the accounting for and the disclosure of R&D expenditure and activities can be explained by 
the reduction of information asymmetries and agency costs.  The results confirm that three 
aspects of information asymmetry investigated, research intensity, the use of R&D financing 
arrangements and the percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned, are important in 
explaining the discretionary capitalisation of R&D expenditure. Furthermore, research 
intensity, and the use of an R&D financing arrangements, are significant in explaining 
voluntary disclosure of R&D expenditure and activities.  These results are robust to the 
inclusion of controls for other economic characteristics of the firm including, share issue, size, 
accounting performance, leverage, proprietary costs and tax status. 
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1.  Introduction  
 Australian reporting requirements offer considerable discretion in the accounting for 
research and development (R&D) expenditure, especially when compared to the conservative 
U.S. regulations, where almost all R&D outlays are required to be expensed in the period 
incurred (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.2, (SFAS No.2)). In Australia, the 
accounting standard, AASB1011 ‘Accounting for Research and Development Costs’ permits 
discretionary capitalisation of both ‘research and development’ expenditures. ‘Research and 
development’ is addressed as a single unit, with all R&D costs required to be capitalised if 
they, together with R&D costs already deferred, are expected beyond any reasonable doubt to 
be recoverable.   The objective of this paper is to explain Australian R&D capitalisation and 
voluntary disclosure. 
 This paper argues that the discretionary choices available to management in Australia 
with respect to the accounting for and the disclosure of R&D expenditure and activities can be 
explained by the reduction of information asymmetries and agency costs. It is contended that for 
those firms where value is largely represented by growth opportunities (as opposed to assets-in-
place), monitoring costs will be higher, because managerial actions are less observable in the 
short-run (Smith and Watts, 1992). For firms involved in risky innovation, monitoring of the 
actions of the agent by the principal imposes costs because there are few informative signals 
until the outcome of the innovation is known at some future date (Holthausen, Larcker and 
Sloan, 1995).  In this situation, agency costs can be reduced by increasing information provided 
to shareholders about management's discretionary investment decisions.  Where management 
expects to bear the costs of agency, they have incentives to provide information about the firm's 
R&D activities, in the form of informative accounting method choices and the use of 
discretionary disclosures. 
 The separation of ownership and control in publicly listed companies gives rise to 
information asymmetries between managers and investors/potential investors where managers 
have superior information on the firm's current and future performance to outside investors 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  When information asymmetries are 
persistent, discretionary disclosures by managers provide a potentially important means for 
corporate managers to maximise firm value, by reducing information asymmetries between 
managers and investors/potential investors (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Bartov and Bodnar, 1996).  
Disclosure choices include exhibiting financial reporting discretion, in the choice of 
capitalisation of R&D expenditure, as well as the choice of making voluntary disclosures about 
R&D expenditure and activities.  Although both the use of informative accounting methods and 
discretionary disclosures are predicted to reduce the agency costs of monitoring and information 
asymmetry, these choices are not synonymous.  From a contracting perspective, recognition in 
the financial statements can impact on contracts in place, however, it is only in specific cases 
(e.g., disclosure of contingent liabilities) that disclosure has the potential to impact on 
contractual arrangements.  
 The sample utilised in this paper is all listed Australian firms that conducted R&D in 
1993, being 152 firms. The empirical procedures used involve cross-sectional analysis with the 
results confirming the importance of  three aspects of information asymmetry, research intensity, 
the use of R&D financing arrangements  and the percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned, 
in explaining the discretionary capitalisation of R&D expenditure. As well, research intensity, 
and the use of R&D financing arrangements are significant in explaining voluntary disclosure of 
R&D expenditure and activities. These relationships remain significant after controlling for other 
economic characteristics of the firms.  
 The evidence in this study increases our understanding of accounting and disclosure 
practices for R&D costs in a discretionary reporting environment. This evidence is of 
particular importance to regulators, in both the U.S., with the mandatory expensing of R&D 
expenditure being a controversial issue, and Australia, where the AASB is re-examining the 
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standard on R&D with the aim of achieving consistency with international accounting rules. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: section 2 develops the hypotheses; section 
3 describes the data and empirical procedures used to test those hypotheses. Results are 
presented in section 4, and concluding remarks are provided in section 5.  
  
2. Hypotheses 
2.1 Discretionary Capitalisation of R&D Expenditure 
 Discretionary capitalisation of R&D expenditure has been contended to provide an 
informative signal by which corporate managers impart their knowledge to shareholders and 
outside investors about the results of R&D activities (Hughes & Kao, 1991). Analytical 
research has illustrated that there are advantages in allowing a manager discretion over the 
choice among reporting alternatives in an optimal compensation contract with a rational 
principal. The manager then has the potential to choose a reporting alternative that reduces 
outcome noise inherent in other reporting options specified by the principal (Verrecchia, 
1986).   
 Capitalisation requires managers to establish the prospects of future benefits in excess 
of the amounts spent to the satisfaction of independent auditors, and, as well, verification by 
the auditor every year that future benefits will be realised (Hughes and Kao, 1991). 
Discretionary capitalisation provides a credible signal by which corporate managers impart 
their knowledge about their R&D projects to investors/potential investors; and, in addition, 
discretionary capitalisation results in an earnings number which contains less noise than that 
obtained by the immediate expensing of all R&D expenditure. R&D firms which incur 
persistent information asymmetries and significant monitoring costs between the managers 
and the investors/potential investors have an incentive to provide information about the 
viability of their R&D projects to reduce the monitoring costs.  
 A potential disincentive to the use of discretionary capitalisation is the incurrence of 
proprietary costs, defined by Dye (1986) as ‘information whose disclosure reduces the present 
value of cash flows of the firm endowed with the information’. Verrecchia (1983) claims that as 
the proprietary cost increases, the range of possible interpretations of withheld information 
increases thereby allowing the manager greater discretion.  As analytical research has 
demonstrated, disclosure prevails if the costs of disclosure are low enough or if the information 
asymmetry is sufficiently high (Skinner, 1994, in discussing the models of Verrecchia, 1983 and 
Dye, 1995).  
 
2.2 Voluntary Disclosures about R&D Expenditure and Activities 
 In addition to discretion in accounting for R&D expenditure, managers of Australian 
firms have discretion with respect to what information to disclose about R&D.  The mandated 
disclosure of information about R&D expenditure and activities in the annual report, ie., the 
director's statement, the financial statements and the notes to the financial statements, provides 
information to investors/potential investors of the firm. In addition to the required disclosures, 
firms choose whether to provide voluntary disclosures, including qualitative disclosures in the 
director’s report, about their R&D expenditures and activities. 
 Early theoretical research dealing with voluntary disclosures (Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 
1981) predicted that all private, non-proprietary information will be voluntarily disclosed when 
the discloser is known to be fully informed and there are no costs of disclosure. However, a 
partial-disclosure equilibrium will result if there are costs of disclosing, as disclosure-related 
costs introduce noise by extending the range of possible interpretations of withheld information 
to include news which is actually favourable (Verrecchia, 1983).  A partial disclosure 
 3 
equilibrium, is characteristic of the available empirical evidence (for example, Lev and Penman, 
1990).  
 Additional disclosures released concurrently with announcements of annual earnings 
have been shown by Hoskin, Hughes and Ricks, (1986) to have information content beyond that 
contained in earnings. The most interesting of their findings is the significance of qualitative 
comments by directors regarding the future prospects of their firms. The implication is that such 
comments are viewed by users of financial statements as both credible and informative. This 
result has potential significance for R&D firms as often substantial discussion about R&D 
activities is provided in the director's report of the financial statements of these firms. 
  
2.3 Information Asymmetry 
 The separation of ownership and control in publicly listed companies gives rise to 
information asymmetries between managers and investors/potential investors where managers 
have superior information on the firm's current and future performance to outside investors 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  When information asymmetries are 
persistent, discretionary disclosures by managers provide a potentially important means for 
corporate managers to maximise firm value, by reducing information asymmetries between 
managers and investors/potential investors (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Bartov and Bodnar, 1996).  
Disclosure choices include exhibiting financial reporting discretion where the reporting 
requirements allow managers to exercise judgement, as well as the choice of making voluntary 
disclosures.  Although both informative accounting methods and discretionary disclosures are 
predicted to reduce the agency costs of monitoring and information asymmetry, these choices are 
not synonymous.  From a contracting perspective, recognition in the financial statements can 
impact on contracts in place, however, it is only in specific cases (e.g., disclosure of contingent 
liabilities) that disclosure has the potential to impact on contractual arrangements.  
 The existing research implies that not all R&D firms will have identical disclosure 
strategies (Healy and Palepu, 1993).  The disincentive to providing discretionary disclosure is 
proprietary costs.  Disclosure will prevail if the costs of disclosure are low enough or if the 
information asymmetry is sufficiently high (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985). As proprietary costs 
exist for all R&D firms, alternative interpretations of information not disclosed are possible, 
thereby allowing the manager greater discretion (Verrecchia, 1983) .  
 As the level of information asymmetry is not directly observable, an empirical proxy 
for this variable must be identified. Bartov and Bodnav (1996) discuss how measures of 
information asymmetry traditionally used in the literature, for example, bid-ask spread and 
trading volume, suffer from deficiencies.  In this study three aspects of information asymmetry 
are considered: research intensity, the use of R&D financing arrangements and the  
percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned.  Hypotheses concerning these three aspects of 
information asymmetry are developed in the following sub-sections. 
 
2.3.1 Research Intensity  
Research intensity. Research intensity has been used as a measure of the investment opportunity 
set.  In this research it is argued that argue that contracting-cost explanations for corporate policy 
choices imply that these decisions depend on the firm's investment opportunity set (Smith and 
Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; and Skinner, 1993). In this scenario, corporate financing, 
dividend and other policy decisions are empirically related to the investment opportunity set and 
to each other. Consistent with this hypothesis, Smith and Watts and Gaver and Gaver report 
significant associations between the investment opportunity set and capital structure, dividend 
policy, and executive compensation variables. Accounting method choice and the relationship 
with the investment opportunity set and other corporate policy decisions is considered by 
Skinner (1993). Skinner provides evidence on the cross-sectional variation between the firms' 
investment opportunity set, the nature of their debt and compensation contracts, their size and 
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financial leverage, and their accounting procedure choices. Zimmer (1986), in a more specific 
setting, reports that the investment opportunity set and accounting choice are related. The 
particular investment opportunity set that is of relevance to this study is that of high versus low 
research intensity and the resultant impact on the accounting method and disclosure choices.    
 Differing levels of research intensity have been shown to impact on the nature of 
compensation contracts (Clinch, 1991). Clinch divides R&D firms into high research-intensive 
firms and low research-intensive firms.  He reports that high research-intensive firms tend to be 
younger and smaller than low research-intensive firms.  Clinch finds a strong association 
between the level of R&D expenditure and high-technology status.  He documents differences 
in the explicit compensation contracts offered by high and low research-intensive firms in the 
U.S. and shows how the relationship between total compensation and stock- and accounting-
based performance measures varies with levels of R&D spending.  
 In this study it is recognised that both high research-intensive and low research-
intensive firms are exposed to proprietary costs.  High research-intensive firms incur persistent 
information asymmetries and significant monitoring costs between the managers and the 
investors/potential investors.  The managers of these firms need to provide information about the 
viability of their R&D projects to reduce the agency costs of information asymmetry and 
monitoring.  If capitalisation is considered a discretionary disclosure, a disincentive to the use of 
selective capitalisation is proprietary costs.  However, the benefits of reducing the persistent 
information asymmetry costs of a high research-intensive firm will outweigh the additional 
proprietary costs incurred.  As analytical research has demonstrated, disclosure prevails if the 
costs of disclosure are low enough or if the information asymmetry is sufficiently high.     
 Low research-intensive firms can be characterised by transitory information asymmetries 
and limited monitoring costs. This implies that for low research-intensive firms the benefits 
associated with capitalisation will not exceed the costs of the auditor justifying the capitalisation 
of R&D expenditure, the risk that the economic benefits from the R&D expenditure may not be 
realised and potential proprietary costs. Also because managers wish to maintain high credibility 
with financial statement users, they are unlikely to capitalise R&D expenditure if there is the 
slightest risk of the benefits not being realised (Daley and Vigeland, 1983).1 This lower level of 
disclosure limits the proprietary costs incurred. Managers will choose to selectively capitalise 
R&D expenditure if the expected benefits outweigh any potential costs.  It follows that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: High research-intensive firms use discretionary capitalisation of their R&D  
expenditure to a greater extent than low research-intensive firms. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: High research-intensive firms provide more voluntary disclosures about their 
R&D expenditures and activities than low research-intensive firms. 
 
 
2.3.2 R&D Financing Arrangements. 
                                                
1
 Daley and Vigeland (1983) provide a US study of accounting for R&D in a discretionary reporting 
environment. They investigated the motivation for management’s choice among alternative accounting principles 
before the introduction of SFAS No.2 in 1974. Their results support the hypothesis that firms with higher 
leverage and tighter dividend restrictions (both typical types of debt covenant restrictions) are more likely to 
capitalise some R&D costs. In addition, larger firms were found to be more likely to expense consistent with the 
political cost hypothesis, ie, managers (particularly those of larger firms), could undermine their credibility by 
adopting reporting rules which are perceived as unorthodox by financial statement users.  Daley and Vigeland 
(1983) note that a possible omitted variable is the magnitude of R&D expenditures which might affect the 
accounting method selected (in 1972 R&D expense was not a required disclosure). Additional testing showed that 
the R&D/sales variable was insignificant. However, that test suffered from omitting capitalisers whose R&D 
intensity may be small and from an inability to obtain R&D expenditures for the numerator for some firms. 
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 R&D financing arrangements constitute the formation of a separate organisation to 
finance part or all of the firm's R&D activities. Government incentives to encourage 
expenditure on R&D have existed in Australia since 1 July 1985 (s.73B of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (C'th)) with companies able to deduct up to 150 percent of their R&D 
expenditure when lodging their tax returns. The rate of deduction for R&D expenditure has 
been reduced to a maximum of 125 percent after 20 August 1996, except where the 
expenditure was required to be incurred by a contract entered into before that time. R&D 
collaboration by companies with insufficient resources to undertake an R&D project alone has 
been encouraged by the government’s syndicated R&D provisions.2   The provisions allow 
two or more eligible companies to form a syndicate to undertake R&D project(s) and claim 
their proportion of such expenditure at a concessionary rate. A syndicate usually involves a 
research company and two or more investors (one of which can be the research company 
itself). Changes to the taxation rules in 1996 mean that new syndicates will not qualify for tax 
concessions.3 
 A firm, usually a small or medium sized enterprise, has tax losses, but would like to 
undertake further R&D on a pre-existing technology - called ‘core’ technology.  This core 
technology has been developed in-house or purchased from other researchers (CSIRO, overseas 
etc).  The R&D would be eligible for the 150 percent concession, but the firm either (a) cannot 
obtain finance and/or (b) believes that future profits are so far away that the concession is worth 
relatively little in present value terms.  Syndication fills this gap.  The Bureau of Industry 
Economics Research Report Syndicated R&D - An Evaluation of the Syndication Program 
released in 1994 claims that syndication plays a significant role in accelerating R&D, with the 
result that innovations are earlier to market than they would otherwise be.  
 There were two major forms of syndications: guaranteed and at risk.  Guaranteed 
syndicates comprise about 85 percent of the total number currently approved by the IR&D 
Board.4 These syndicates provide investors with a guaranteed rate of return on funds, regardless 
of the success of the R&D conducted under the syndication program.  Basically these syndicates 
transfer enough of the researcher's tax losses to the financial investor to provide a guaranteed 
return on the total funds provided by the investor.  The tax losses are transferred through 
deductions claimed by the financial investor on payments to the researcher for the licence of the 
core technology and for undertaking a defined program of R&D.  Because the investor enjoys a 
guaranteed return on funds invested, the associated tax deductibility is limited to 100 percent.  
Only a small number of the total syndicates that have been approved currently involve ‘at risk’ 
arrangements.5 
                                                
2
 These are contained in (s.39P) of the Industrial Research and Development Act, 1986 and s.73B (3A and 9A) 
of the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936 introduced from November 1987. 
 
3
 The 150 percent R&D tax concession was Australia's major program for promoting private industrial R&D.  The 
syndicated R&D provisions (s39P) of the Industrial Research and Development Act, 1986 and s73B (3A and 9A) of 
the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936 were introduced from November 1987, following a mid-term review of the 
150 percent incentive.  Syndication was introduced to encourage R&D collaboration by companies with insufficient 
resources to undertake an R&D project alone.  The provisions allow for two or more eligible companies to form a 
syndicate and contract out or undertake R&D project(s) and claim their proportion of such expenditure at a 
concessionary rate under s73B of the Income Tax Assessment Act.  A syndicate usually involves a research company 
and two or more investors (one of which can be the research company itself).   
 
3 As at August 1994, 114 syndicates, involving 81 research firms had been approved. 
5
 AusIndustry officials claim that they offer some advantages over guaranteed syndicates.  Any investor who has a 
strategic interest in the core technology of the research firm and is willing to put some or all of its funds at risk, 
receives a 150 percent deduction for R&D activities rather than the 100 percent allowed for guaranteed syndicates. 
The determination as to whether funds are at risk is a matter for the Commissioner of Taxation under subsection 
73CA(5) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. At risk syndicates do not require the researcher to have significant 
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 Research and development can also be conducted through the medium of a joint venture.  
Many of the R&D syndicates are constituted as unincorporated joint ventures.  Joint ventures 
among companies have become common in the Australian environment when the financial 
resources, technology or management skills necessary to accomplish a project are beyond the 
capacity of any of the individual participants.  Joint ventures can be a ‘corporate joint venture’ or 
a ‘contractual joint venture’ (ie., an unincorporated contractual arrangement).6  
 The contracting and monitoring costs associated with R&D activity are expected to be 
large relative to more conventional investments for a number of reasons including the 
potentially long lead time until the outcomes of the projects become known (Holmstrom, 
1989). When incentive contracting fails to minimise agency costs, the theory predicts a 
substitution of monitoring or other control mechanisms (Francis and Smith, 1995).  
Unbundling the R&D activities from the firm, through the use of financial intermediaries, 
enables a closer monitoring of the R&D activities, as often the participants in these R&D 
financing arrangements are institutional investors. Financial intermediation is difficult to 
explain in traditional models of financial equilibrium, however, it is a natural response to 
asymmetric information (Leland and Pyle (1977). Another reason for the intermediary 
function proposed by Campbell (1979), is to maintain the confidentiality of information about 
the firm's investment projects possessed by manager-insiders but valued by competing firms.  
Intermediation provides financing and at the same time protects information from other types 
of market makers.  Intermediation, by the use of R&D financing arrangements, would be 
predicted to be used by R&D firms which incur persistent information asymmetries.  Thus it 
would be expected that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms which finance any of their R&D activities by the use of R&D 
financing arrangements use discretionary capitalisation of their R&D 
expenditure to a greater extent than firms which do not use R&D financing 
arrangements.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: R&D firms which finance any of their R&D activities by the use of R&D 
financing arrangements provide more voluntary disclosures about their 
R&D expenditures and activities than R&D firms which do not use R&D 
financing arrangements. 
 
2.3.3 Percentage of Subsidiaries not wholly owned.  
When a subsidiary is wholly owned, it would be expected that there would be a lower 
disparity in the level of information held by shareholders as compared to the level of 
information held by shareholders in subsidiaries that are not wholly owned.  This is because 
shareholders in a wholly owned firm would be more confident that the management of their 
firm is in a position to give them access to information more readily. The extent of minority 
interests is regarded as a measure of the degree of information asymmetry between managers 
and investors/potential investors. The key issue with reducing information asymmetries among 
market participants so as to maximise market value is increasing the expected liquidity in the 
market (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). For this to happen, there must be a ‘credible 
commitment’ to maintaining the level of disclosure in the future (Amihud and Mendelson, 1988; 
                                                                                                                                                     
tax losses and offer a way to establish strategic linkages between small to medium sized research companies and 
larger corporate investors.  
 
6
 Corporate joint ventures would usually involve joint control and so would avoid requirements to be 
consolidated in the individual participant's financial statements (AASB1006 ‘Accounting for Interests in Joint 
Ventures’).  If, in either a corporate or contractual joint venture, one participant has control of the financial and 
operating policies, that participant would be required to consolidate the joint venture in their financial statements 
(AASB1024 ‘Consolidated Accounts’). 
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Baiman and Verrecchia, 1993; Bartov and Bodnar, 1996). Discretionary capitalisation 
constitutes a much greater commitment from managers than the provision of voluntary 
disclosures. Managers wishing to maintain credibility with financial statement users are unlikely 
to capitalise R&D expenditure where there is the risk of the benefits not being realised (Daley 
and Vigeland, 1983).   Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: R&D firms with high levels of percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned 
use discretionary capitalisation of their R&D expenditure to a greater extent 
than R&D firms with lower levels of percentage of subsidiaries not wholly 
owned. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: R&D firms with high levels of percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned 
provide more voluntary disclosures about their R&D expenditures and 
activities than R&D firms with lower levels of percentage of subsidiaries not 
wholly owned.  
 
3. Data and variable specification issues.  
3.1 Sample 
The sample is composed of all listed companies in Australia that reported either R&D 
expenditure and/or made disclosures about R&D expenditure or activities in their 1993 
financial statements. The firms were selected by manually searching the 1993 annual reports 
for discussions about R&D in the financial statements, the notes to the financial statements or 
in the director's report. This manual search was conducted by using the CD-ROM from the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) which contained all the annual reports for 1993 of all listed 
companies (approximately 1100 companies). From the original search of the CD-ROM, 183 
companies were found to mention R&D in the audited components of the financial statements. 
Firms were eliminated if they were (i) not Australian-based listed companies; (ii) banks; (iii) 
financial institutions, or (iv) government bodies, as different legislation applies to these 
entities in 1993. As well, firms were eliminated if their financial year was either less than, or 
more than twelve months, if they did not actually incur R&D costs in 1993. Computer and 
software companies were also excluded on the basis that there is a separate standard in the US 
dealing with software development. One further company was eliminated because influence 
diagnostics indicate that this observation is influential. This process yielded 152 companies 
for 1993. 
3.2 Dependent variables 
 Discretionary capitalisation. The first dependent variable is the accounting treatment 
of R&D expenditure. The accounting treatment of R&D expenditure is defined as a 
dichotomous variable, discretionary capitalisation, which is assigned a value of one if the 
firm is a ‘discretionary capitaliser’, and zero otherwise.  A ‘discretionary capitaliser’ is 
defined as a firm that exercises the discretion available within the Australian accounting 
regulations by capitalising any of their R&D expenditure. This policy includes capitalisation 
and amortisation over the period of benefits, as well as capitalisation of some R&D 
expenditure with immediate expensing of other R&D expenditure or  write-off of unsuccessful 
projects.  
 A considerable number of firms whose principal activity is R&D do not disclose the 
amounts of R&D capitalised or expensed, even though AASB 1011 requires material R&D 
expenditure to be disclosed (clause .60). For these firms categorisation is based on their stated 
financial policy. An example of an accounting policy note of a company that does not disclose 
their R&D expenditure is taken from the 1993 Annual Report of Accel Industrial and Mineral 
Processes Ltd.  The principal activities are the development of processes and techniques for the 
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dissolution and recovery of gold and other metals throughout the world.  The accounting policy 
note on deferred expenditure reads (p.19): 
Material expenditure on research and development which is expected to benefit and contribute to the 
earning capacity of future periods and does not relate solely to current revenue is capitalised and 
amortised over the period during which the related benefits are expected to be realised.  Deferred 
expenditure is only carried forward where realisation from future benefits is assured beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
 Other firms whose principal activity is R&D do not disclose details about the method 
of accounting for or the amount of their R&D expenditure at all. These firms are coded as 
immediate expensers and assigned a zero value.  
 
 Voluntary disclosure. The second dependent variable is voluntary disclosure. A 
disclosure is considered voluntary where the firm has provided information in excess of that 
required by AASB1011.  Disclosures about R&D expenditure and activities could appear in 
any part of the annual report, for example, the chairman’s report.  For the purposes of this 
study, disclosures are recorded if they are in the audited parts of the annual reports: the 
financial statements, the notes to the financial statements or the Director’s Report as these 
disclosures would be the most credible.7  
 The dummy variable, voluntary disclosure, is assigned a value of one if there are 
voluntary disclosures in the financial statements, the notes to the financial statements or the 
Director’s Report about R&D expenditures or R&D activities, and zero otherwise. A 
disclosure is treated as mandatory if information about R&D expenditure and activities is 
disclosed in: 
  
  (i)  the accounting policy note; 
(ii) the note on operating profit before income tax and/or the note on 
intangibles or non-current assets;  
(iii) the note on income tax.  
 For example, AASB1011 requires disclosure of material R&D expenditure expensed 
and/or capitalised.  This information could appear in either the note on operating profit before 
income tax and/or the note on intangibles/non-current assets.  A voluntary disclosure is defined 
as a disclosure in: 
(i) The director's report ; 
(ii)  the cash flow statement; or  
   (iii)  a note other than the mandatory ones described.  
 To assist in the categorisation of disclosures as a voluntary disclosure, a disclosure index 
was developed. The index consists of disclosures made in these seven areas of the annual report: 
 (i)  the director's report; 
 (ii) the cash flow statement; 
 (iii)  the note on statement of significant accounting policies; 
 (iv)  the note on operating profit before income tax; 
 (v)  the note on income tax; 
   (vi)  the note on intangibles or non-current assets; 
                                                
7
 The Director’s Report is audited to the extent that the information contained within needs to be consistent with 
the information in the financial statements and the notes to the financial statements. 
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 (vii) any other note. 
Firms providing disclosures in four of the seven disclosure areas listed above, in addition to the 
disclosure being a ‘voluntary disclosure’, are coded as one (voluntary disclosure), all others are 
coded zero.  For example, companies who disclose detailed information about R&D activities in 
the director's report but do not reveal their R&D expenditure, are coded as zero.   
 To enable consideration of the sensitivity of the results to the use of a dichotomous 
variable, an alternative specification using a continuous variable is also developed.  This 
continuous variable, discretionary detail, is measured by using the disclosure index listed 
above.  Although the maximum score using this index is seven, disclosures are coded on a six 
point scale depending on the number of areas in the annual report that information about R&D is 
disclosed.  Summation implies a discrete interval scale for disclosures about R&D ranging from 
zero to six. 
 
3.3 Independent variables. 
 Research intensity is measured as a dichotomous variable.  The sample is sorted on the 
variable, R&D expenditure/total assets. R&D expenditure includes R&D costs incurred during 
1993 that were either expensed or capitalised. If R&D expenditure/total assets is greater than the 
median value, 0.0075 (0.75%), the firm is coded as high research-intensive. This result is 
checked by sorting on the median of R&D expenditure/sales. If R&D expenditure/sales of a 
company is greater than the median value, 0.0075 (0.75%), and R&D expenditure/total assets is 
greater than 0.005 (0.5%), it is regarded as high research-intensive.8, 9 
 One of the problems encountered in this study was the limited disclosures of some of the 
companies involved in R&D. These companies undertake R&D activities very intensively, but 
do not disclose the amounts spent on R&D.  For example, Biota Holdings Limited reveal their 
principal activities to be research and investment. In the review of operations of Biota Holdings 
Limited the directors state that the company has continued its ongoing research program and has 
commenced a new exploratory project in the area of cancer therapy. AASB1011 requires that the 
accounts or group accounts shall disclose, if material, the amount of R&D costs charged to the 
profit and loss account during the financial year and/or the amounts of R&D costs incurred 
during the financial year and deferred to future financial years (clause .60). For those firms 
which do not disclose the amounts spent on R&D, a subjective decision on the level of their 
R&D intensity is made based on their disclosures. Based on the disclosures, Biota is classified as 
high research-intensive.10 
                                                
8
 Eagle Bay Resources NL is included as R&D intensive even though R&D expenditure/total assets is 0.41% as 
R&D expenditure/sales is 3.44%. Incitec Ltd is regarded as non-research intensive.  Incitec sits on the median value 
of R&D expenditure/total assets of 0.75%, however, R&D expenditure/sales is 0.44%.  Therefore, it has been coded 
as zero. Another company that has been coded as zero is MIM Ltd.  R&D expenditure/total assets is 0.39% and 
R&D  expenditure/sales is 1.2%. There are six companies where R&D expenditure/sales is greater than 
0.75% and R&D expenditure/total assets is less than 0.75% and greater than 0.5%.  These are Denehurst Ltd, 
Futuris Ltd, James Hardie Ltd, Paper Technology Ltd, Tandou Ltd and Westralian Sands Ltd. These firms are 
coded as research intensive. 
 
9
 In the study by Clinch (1991), the final sample of 200 companies were divided into two subsamples of low and 
high R&D firms, based on whether the 1981-85 R&D-to-sales ratio was less than or greater than the median value 
of 0.018 for the full sample. The full sample (843 firms) consisted of companies that spanned the R&D 
dimension, including 200 with zero R&D expenditure.  This study does not include any companies that were not 
involved in R&D activities during 1993. 
 
10
 Nine companies are categorised as research intensive based on their disclosures only.  Of these nine companies, 
three are categorised as ‘discretionary capitalisers’ based on their accounting policy note.  Six companiers are 
classified as ‘immediate expensers’ based either on their accounting policy note or because no details were  
disclosed about the accounting for or the amount of their R&D expenditure at all.  
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 R&D financing arrangements are defined as separate organisational forms, for 
example, R&D syndicates or R&D joint ventures, and are identified by reading the financial 
statements. A dummy variable, R&D financing arrangement, is assigned a value of one if the 
firm uses a R&D financing arrangement for some part of its R&D and a zero value in all other 
cases.11 Many of the companies use R&D financing arrangements for only a component of the 
R&D projects undertaken by the firm. That is, firms have a portfolio of R&D projects.  
 Percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned is measured as a continuous variable.  
One of the note disclosures required to be made by Australian companies (but not U.S. 
companies) is a list of the controlled entities (subsidiaries) and the equity holdings in each 
subsidiary.    From this note disclosure, it can be ascertained how many of the subsidiaries are 
wholly owned and how many subsidiaries have some level of minority interest. The variable, 
percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned, is measured by the extent of minority 
stakeholders, that is, one minus the percentage of subsidiaries in each sample company that 
are wholly owned (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993).12 
 
3.4 Control variables. The accounting policy and disclosure choices for R&D are likely to be 
influenced by factors in addition to those within the theoretical domain of this study. Recent 
empirical evidence indicates that firms accessing capital markets are likely to disclose more 
information (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Managers have incentives to increase disclosure 
when they view the firms’ shares as being undervalued and anticipate that there are costs 
associated with this undervaluation, if managers have superior information on their firms’ 
performance (Healy, Palepu & Sweeney, 1995). Increased liquidity achieved via greater 
disclosure and reduced information asymmetry attracts greater institutional investment and a 
wider clientele (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Merton, 1987).  
These disclosures involve a credible commitment from managers to increase the precision of 
public information about firm value (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). A dummy variable set 
to one is used if there was a share issue in 1992 or 1993 (share issue). Firms that increase the 
number of their securities traded should prompt an increased demand for information, i.e., 
public issue should be positively associated with disclosure (Scott, 1994). 
  Firm size is included as a control variable (size) in this study because size as an 
explanatory variable is consistent with various hypotheses, notably the political cost hypothesis 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Large firms will attempt to reduce their political cost by 
selecting income-decreasing policies, such as the expensing of R&D. The measure of firm size 
used is the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt (current liabilities plus 
long-term debt). This measure is consistent with the measure used in Skinner (1993) and Bartov 
& Bodnar (1996). 
 Accounting performance is also used as a control because recent accounting 
performance is likely to be correlated with the nature of the assets of the firm. Firms for which 
assets-in-place comprise a large fraction of value will be expected to have generated greater 
cash flows and will have accounting profits that are systematically higher than other firms. 
The measure of firm performance used is the accounting return on assets (Skinner, 1993), 
calculated as operating profit (before depreciation and amortisation) adjusted for R&D 
capitalised in 1993, divided by the market value of the firm at the beginning of the year. 
                                                
11
 Queensland Metals has a R&D joint venture has well as a co-operative research agreement with CSIRO (coded 
as 1).  Of the 25 spin-offs, two are limited partnerships, five are joint ventures (these may be R&D syndicates), 
and 18 are denoted as R&D syndicates, which are usually unincorporated joint ventures.  Some of these 18, are 
described as research commitments but other note disclosures indicate that they are R&D syndicates. 
12
 The focus is on the number of subsidiaries rather than the magnitude of minority shareholdings because a ‘case 
of fraud can be brought by any minority shareholder, and is not dependent on the size of the minority interest’ 
(McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993, 42).  
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 Highly leveraged firms tend to choose income-increasing accounting methods such as 
capitalisation of R&D (Bowen et al., 1981; Daley and Vigeland, 1983). Leverage (proxying 
for proximity to a borrowing constraint) is not expected to be an explanator of accounting 
choice for R&D expenditure in Australia as debt contracts typically exclude intangible assets 
from the measure of leverage (Whittred and Zimmer, 1986). However, a measure of leverage, 
(leverage) liabilities/total tangible assets, is included as a control variable.  
 An additional variable which has also been shown to impact on accounting policy 
choice is tax status, as R&D activity is likely to be related to a firm's tax status. High research-
intensive firms tend to be younger and smaller than low research-intensive firms (Clinch, 1991).  
Clinch presents weak evidence that more high research-intensive than low research-intensive 
firms experience tax loss carry-forwards in the U.S. The measure of tax status (tax status) used 
is the value of the tax loss component of the future income tax benefit not carried forward as 
an asset, scaled by total assets.   
 While this study recognises that all R&D firms are exposed to proprietary costs, the 
potential impact of cross-sectional variation in the level of these costs should not be ignored.  
Therefore, a measure of proprietary costs will be included as a control variable (proprietary 
costs). There are limited studies that have included a measure of proprietary costs in their 
analysis.  One possible proxy for a measure of proprietary costs is a measure of product 
market competition.  In the analytical literature, Darrough and Stoughton (1990) conclude that 
competition encourages disclosure, although competition refers to potential entrants to the 
product market, rather than existing competitors.  In the latter case, Verrecchia (1983) has 
shown that competition discourages disclosure.  Therefore, as this study looks at existing 
competitors, the measure of proprietary costs used is product market competition. An 
empirical paper that uses this measure of proprietary costs is Lee, Taylor and Walter (1995).  
They measure product market competition as the industry market share of the largest 
competitors as reported by the Statex Investment Service for the period ending most closely 
prior to an Initial Public Offering.  This measure will be used here.  
 
3.5   Descriptive statistics. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on all variables. Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics concerning financial profiles of the sample firms split into two 
sub-samples based on the dichotomous independent variable, research intensity. Significant 
differences between the two groups, high research-intensive and low research-intensive, exist 
on the dimensions of size, accounting performance and tax status, but there is no relationship 
to the measure of leverage used (or to the alternative measure of leverage not reported). Using 
SFAS2 as an example, Shehata (1991) raises concerns regarding self-selection bias in empirical 
studies that examine the economic consequences of mandatory accounting changes.  Self-
selection bias can occur when managers must choose between options (e.g., accounting 
methods). Managers do not choose randomly from the available accounting alternatives but 
rather on the basis of the firm's characteristics and the comparative advantages of each method. 
Shehata (1991) provides results indicating that the two groups of firms, capitalisers and 
expensers, are different in characteristics as well as in the structure of their R&D investment 
function. It can be seen in Table 2, that splitting the sample firms on the level of research 
intensity reveals differences in the financial characteristics of these firms. 
    Tables 1 and  2 here 
4. Results 
4.1 Univariate Tests 
 The results of the tests of H1a, that R&D firms with high levels of research intensity 
use discretionary capitalisation of their R&D expenditure to a greater extent than R&D firms 
with lower levels of research intensity, are presented in Table 3a. The results provide support 
for  this hypothesis (p < 0.01). H1b, that R&D firms with high levels of research intensity 
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provide more voluntary disclosures that R&D firms with lower levels of research intensity is 
also supported (Table 3b). Overall, R&D firms with higher levels of research intensity are 
more likely to choose discretionary capitalisation of their R&D expenditure and voluntary 
disclosures about their R&D expenditures than R&D firms with lower levels of research 
intensity.   
Tables 3a and 3b  here 
The results of H2a and b, that R&D firms that use R&D financing arrangements select 
discretionary capitalisation of and voluntary disclosures about their R&D expenditures and 
activities than R&D firms which do not use R&D financing arrangements, are presented in 
Tables 4a and b.  This hypothesis is also supported, as is illustrated in Table 4a and b (p < 
0.01).    
Table 4a and b here 
 The results of H3a and b, that R&D firms with high levels of percentage of 
subsidiaries not wholly owned use discretionary capitalisation of and voluntary disclosures 
about their R&D expenditures and activities than R&D firms with lower levels of percentage 
of subsidiaries not wholly owned, are presented in Tables 5a and b.  Percentage of 
subsidiaries not wholly owned is an important determinant of discretionary capitalisation, p < 
0.01 (Table 5a).  However, the variable, percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned, is not a 
significant determinant of voluntary disclosure (Table 5b).  
Tables 5a and b here 
4.2 Multivariate Tests 
 Table 6 reports the correlations among the variables. While there are several 
statistically significant correlations between some of the explanatory variables, none of them 
are highly correlated. Spearman pairwise correlations coefficients are reported as the data 
contains both dichotomous and continuous variables. While the univariate tests support the 
hypotheses, these results may be due to correlations among the explanatory variables. A 
multivariate test allows for correlations among the explanatory variables and provides a means 
for determining the incremental effect of each variable and the overall explanatory power of 
all variables. The dependent variables are dichotomous variables so a logistic model is used to 
simultaneously test the hypothesis.   
Table 6 here 
 The results of the logistic model to explain the decision to choose discretionary 
capitalisation of R&D expenditure are presented in Table 7. The multivariate regression results 
are supportive of the univariate results. In particular, the coefficient estimates of research 
intensity and percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned, remain positive and significant at the 
one percent level. In contrast to the univariate results, the coefficient estimate of R&D financing 
arrangement, is weakly significant (at the ten percent level). Although the coefficient estimate of 
the control variable, tax status, is significant (p < 0.05), the coefficient estimates of research 
intensity and percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned, are more significant. Therefore, the 
aspects of information asymmetry, research intensity and percentage of subsidiaries not wholly 
owned, appear to be important variables in explaining discretionary capitalisation of R&D 
expenditure, even after controlling for economic characteristics of the firms. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
 
 The results of the logistic model explaining the decision to choose voluntary 
disclosure about R&D expenditure and activities are presented in Table 8. These results are 
consistent with the univariate results. The estimated coefficient of research intensity is 
positive and significant at the one-percent level. The coefficient estimate of R&D financing 
arrangement, is only weakly significant at the ten percent level, and the coefficient estimate 
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of percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned remains insignificant. None of the 
coefficient estimates of the control variables are significant.13 
     Table 8 here 
  
4.3 Supplementary Testing 
 The results of the models of discretionary capitalisation and voluntary disclosure appear 
to indicate that there is a hierarchy of choices available to the manager.  Alternatively, these 
choices may interact in some way, that is, capitalisation and disclosure could be complements or 
substitutes.  Prior research does not offer clear guidance.  As the measures of discretionary 
capitalisation and voluntary disclosure are positively correlated and significant at the one-percent 
level this provides initial empirical evidence that there is a complex interaction of decisions 
involved. The resolution of this hierarchy of choices may lie in the domain of theorists. 
To gauge whether the importance of information asymmetry ‘swamps’ proprietary 
costs, the sample has been split based on the level of research intensity, and the analysis re-
run.  That is, using firstly, high research-intensive firms and secondly, low research-intensive 
firms. When the results (not reported) are compared with the original results: 
For the model of discretionary capitalisation using high research-intensive firms: the 
important determinants of capitalisation are percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned, the 
use of R&D financing arrangements and tax status. Using low research-intensive firms: the 
model is no longer significant, indicating that the results in the original analysis are driven by 
high research intensity, even if proprietary costs are high.  The only variable that is significant 
is the percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned.  
For the model of voluntary disclosure: for both the groups ‘high research-intensive’ 
and ‘low research-intensive’ the model is insignificant and all the variables are insignificant 
(in the original model only the measure of research intensity is significant).  These results 
would appear to indicate that research intensity, is an important determinant of capitalisation 
regardless of the level of proprietary costs.  
The models of discretionary capitalisation and voluntary disclosure are re-run with the 
nine companies, categorised as research-intensive based on their disclosures only, omitted 
from the analysis.  These results are reported in Tables 9 and 10.  The results are essentially 
unchanged.   
Tables 9 and 10 here  
As well, the model of voluntary disclosure is re-run with ‘voluntary disclosure’ 
measured as a continuous variable, discretionary disclosure. The results are reported in Table 
11. These results are similar to the results of the logistic model. The estimated coefficient on 
research intensity is positive and significant at the one-percent level. The coefficient estimate 
on the use of R&D financing arrangements is significant at the one-percent level. The 
coefficient estimate of percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned is not significant. None of 
the coefficient estimates of the control variables are significant, except for tax status (at the 
five-percent level). 
Table 11 here 
The supplementary testing reflects that while some of the results for the model of 
discretionary capitalisation are sensitive to the level of research intensity, the result for the 
                                                
13
 Appendix A reports the results using more sensitive splits for the decision on the dichotomous variable 
‘intensity’.  Firstly, research intensity is set to 1 if R&D expenditure/assets is greater than 1.00%; 1 = 67 and 0 = 
85. These results are reported in Table A7.1 and A8.1. Second, research intensity is set to 1 if R&D 
expenditure/assets is greater than 1.00% and 0 is greater than 0.1% and less than or equal to 1.00. With this split 
there were no subjective decisions, i.e., the nine companies coded as research intensive based on their disclosures 
only are excluded. With this specification, n = 129, with 1 = 61 and 0 = 68. These results are reported in Tables 
A7.2 and A8.2.   With both specifications the results are similar to those reported in the main body of the paper. 
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variable, percentage of subsidiaries not wholly owned, remains.  This provides further 
validation for the results of the full sample.  The persistence of this result would refute an 
argument that the capitalisation of R&D is driven by materiality, that is, high research-
intensive firms would choose to capitalise because of the magnitude of their expenditures. 
   
5. Concluding remarks 
 This study provides evidence of the accounting and disclosure choices in the specialised 
setting of R&D firms in the discretionary reporting environment of Australia. The results and the 
inferences that can be drawn from this study are as follows. First, for the model of discretionary 
capitalisation, the aspects of information asymmetry, research intensity and percentage of 
subsidiaries not wholly owned, appear to be important in explaining discretionary capitalisation 
of R&D expenditure, after controlling for share issue, size, accounting performance, leverage, 
proprietary costs and tax status. Some support is found for the use of R&D financing 
arrangements, in explaining discretionary capitalisation. Second, for the model of voluntary 
disclosure, the aspect of information asymmetry, research intensity, appears to be important in 
explaining voluntary disclosure of R&D expenditure and activities, with the use of R&D 
financing arrangements, also having some support in explaining voluntary disclosures. None of 
the coefficient estimates of the control variables are significant except for the measure of tax 
status (p < 0.05) in the model of discretionary capitalisation. 
 The evidence presented is subject to several limitations. First is the extent to which the 
empirical measures used capture the hypothesised variables. However, the results generally 
support the arguments developed in this study. Furthermore, although the results could be driven 
by variables other than those of interest to this study, when measures for correlated omitted 
variables are included in the model the results are unaltered. Second is the generalisability of the 
results. This study looks specifically at R&D firms, which limits the generalisability to a broad 
cross-section of firms. Another limitation of the study concerns the non-compliance of some 
companies with the disclosure requirements of the R&D standard. These possible measurement 
errors could impact on the results. Fourth, explanatory variables in accounting choice studies are  
endogeneous (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). This endogeneity can introduces multicollinearity, 
which could affect the results. The correlation table (Table 6) indicates that while several of 
these correlations are statistically significant, their absolute values are generally low. 
 The results of the models of discretionary capitalisation and voluntary disclosure 
appear to indicate that there is a hierarchy of choices available to management.  It is interesting 
that three of the aspects of information asymmetry in the discretionary capitalisation model are 
significant but only two are significant in the model of voluntary disclosures.  Certainly, 
discretionary capitalisation constitutes a much greater commitment from managers than the 
provision of voluntary disclosures. This in-depth study of the determinants of accounting and 
disclosure choice, within a specialised setting of R&D firms, improves our understanding of 
accounting choice, especially when the discretionary nature of the Australian reporting 
environment is considered. This evidence is of particular importance given the international 
interest in accounting for R&D costs. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics of Firms that Undertook  
R&D in Australia in 1993; n = 152. 
 
 
Variables 
 
Mean  
 
Median 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
 
Discretionary 
Capitalisation 
 
0.441 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
1.000 
 
 0.241 
 
-1.968 
Voluntary Disclosure 0.421 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.323 -1.921 
Research Intensity 0.566 1.000 0.000 1.000 -0.268 -1.954 
Percent of Subsidiaries 
not wholly owned 
0.211 0.062 0.000 1.000  1.644  1.310 
R&D Financing 
Arrangement 
0.165 0.000 0.000 1.000  1.828  1.360 
Share Issue 0.645 1.000 0.000 1.000 -0.611 -1.649 
Size (in millions) 963.1 71.135 1.610 35173  7.717 72.153 
Accounting Performance 0.084 0.122 -4.910 1.440 -5.354 45.225 
Proprietary Costs 0.471 0.406 0.190 1.000  1.132  -0.050 
Leverage  0.540 0.490 0.010 2.13 1.619 4.240 
Tax Status 0.060 0.003 0.000 0.960 4.250 22.117 
 
Discretionary Capitalisation 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is discretionary capitalisation of any  R&D 
expenditure, 
Voluntary Disclosure 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there are voluntary disclosures about R&D. Disclosures 
made in the following notes: accounting policy, operating profit and/or intangibles/non-
current assets, and income tax are regarded as mandatory. Disclosures need to be 
provided in four of the possible areas, as well as being a ‘voluntary disclosure’ to be 
coded as 1.   
Research Intensity  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/assets is greater than the median value 
(0.75%), 
Percent of Subsidiaries not wholly owned1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned, 
R&D Financing Arrangement  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a R&D financing arrangement in place, 
Share Issue   0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a share issue in 1992 or 1993, 
Size    Market value of equity + book value of debt, 
Accounting Performance Accounting return on assets [operating profit 1993 + (depreciation and 
amortisation)1993- R&D capitalised 1993]/market value firm 1992, 
Proprietary Costs                                   Market share of the largest competitor in the same industry, 
Leverage    Liabilities/total tangible assets,  
Tax Status   Tax loss component of the future income tax benefit not carried forward/total assets. 
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Table 2 
Selected Attributes of R&D Firms Classified by Research Intensity; 1993;  
n = 152; High = 86; Low = 66. 
 
 Variable High 
ResearchIntensive 
N 
Mean 
(Median) 
Low 
ResearchIntensive 
N 
Mean 
(Median) 
Independent 
t-test 
(Two-tailed) 
Mann-Whitney U 
 
(Two-tailed) 
Size 
(Market Value of Equity 
+ Book Value of Debt) 
86 
484.8m 
(33.7m) 
66 
1586.4m 
(254.08) 
-1.828 
(0.071) 
0.000 
Leverage 
(Liabilities/Total 
Tangible Assets) 
86 
0.5345 
(0.4747) 
66 
0.5477 
(0.5043) 
-0.250 
(0.803) 
0.257 
Accounting  
Performance 
(Accounting Return on 
Assets) 
86 
0.0039 
(0.0858) 
66 
0.1883 
(0.1614) 
-2.236 
(0.027) 
0.001 
Tax Status 
(Tax Loss Component 
of the Future Income 
Tax Benefit Not Carried 
Forward/Total Assets) 
86 
0.0963 
(0.0297) 
66 
0.0127 
(0.0000) 
4.539 
(0.000) 
0.000 
Growth Assets (Total 
Assets (1992 + 1993)/2) 
82 
0.1546 
(0.0645) 
65 
0.1442 
(0.0708) 
0.128 
(0.898) 
0.699 
Growth Liabilities 
(Total Liabilities (1992 
+ 1993)/2) 
82 
2.1277 
( 0.0754) 
65 
0.0629 
(0.0332) 
1.730 
(0.087) 
0.349 
Cash 1992/Total Assets 
1992 
82 
0.0884 
(0.0478) 
64 
0.0443 
(0.0242) 
1.942 
(0.055) 
0.419 
Price-Earnings Ratio 79 
-3.0780 
(10.9121) 
65 
111.2375 
(14.2857) 
-1.695 
(0.095) 
0.027 
Property, Plant and 
Equipment 1993/Market 
Value 1993 
86 
0.3487 
(0.2118) 
66 
0.7647 
(0.5033) 
-3.994 
(0.000) 
0.000 
Market to Book Assets 
1993 
86 
2.0151 
(1.4003) 
66 
1.4197 
(1.1584) 
1.845 
(0.068) 
0.097 
 
Research Intensity 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/assets is greater than the  
   median (0.75%). 
 
 
 
Table 3a 
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Accounting Method Choice for R&D Firms by Type of Research Intensity; Australian 
R&D Firms; 1993; n = 152. 
 
 Immediate  
Expensing 
Discretionary Capitalisation 
Low Research Intensive 48 18 
High Research Intensive 37 49 
 χ2 = 13.37   P = 0.000 
Research Intensity 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/assets is greater than the median. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3b 
Voluntary Disclosure Choice for R&D Firms by Type of Research Intensity; Australian 
Firms; 1993; n = 152. 
 No Voluntary Disclosure Voluntary Disclosure 
Low Research Intensive 56 10 
High Research Intensive 32 54 
 χ2 = 34.77   P = 0.000 
Research Intensity 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/assets is greater than the median  
Voluntary Disclosure 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there are voluntary disclosures about R & D. 
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Table 4a 
Accounting Method Choice for R&D by whether they used an R&D Financing 
Arrangement; Australian Firms; 1993; n = 152. 
 
 Immediate Expensing  Discretionary 
Capitalisation 
No R&D Financing Arrangement 78 49 
R&D Financing Arrangement 7 18 
 χ2 = 9.46 P = 0.000 
R&D Financing Arrangement 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a R&D financing arrangement 
in place. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4b 
Voluntary Disclosure Choice for R&D Firms by whether they used an R&D Financing 
Arrangement; Australian firms; 1993;  n = 152. 
 
 No Voluntary Disclosure Voluntary Disclosure 
No R&D Financing Arrangement 82 45 
R&D Financing Arrangement 6 19 
 χ2 = 14.102 P = 0.000 
R&D Financing Arrangement 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is an R&D financing arrangement in 
place. 
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Table 5a 
Accounting Method Choice for R&D Firms in relation to the Percentage of Subsidiaries 
not wholly owned; n = 152 
Dependent Variable Discretionary Capitalisation 
 Discretionary 
Capitalisation  
= 1       
Discretionary 
Capitalisation  
= 0 
 
 N 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
N 
Mean 
(Std Dev)  
Significance 
   t-test* U-test* 
Percent of Subsidiaries  
 Not wholly owned 
 
 
* One-tailed probabilities 
67 
0.3119 
(0.385) 
85 
0.1316 
(0.238) 
 
3.361 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.005 
 
 Percent of  Subsidiaries not wholly owned 1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5b 
Voluntary Disclosure Choice and the Relationship to the Percentage of Subsidiaries not 
wholly owned;   Australian firms; 1993; n = 152. 
 
Dependent Variable Voluntary Disclosure 
 Voluntary 
Disclosure  
= 1  
Voluntary 
Disclosure 
 = 0 
 
 N 
Mean 
(Std Dev) 
N 
Mean 
(Std Dev)  
Significance 
   t-test* U-test* 
Percent of Subsidiaries 
Not wholly owned  
64 
0.2653 
(0.368) 
88 
0.1716 
(0.281) 
 
1.705 
(0.091) 
 
 
0.526 
* One-tailed probabilities 
    
 
 Percent of Subsidiaries not wholly owned 1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned 
  Voluntary Disclosure   0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there are voluntary 
        disclosures about R&D. 
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     Table 6 
Spearman Pairwise Correlation Coefficients Between the Explanatory & Control 
Variables; n = 152 
 
Variable Intensity Percent
of Subs 
not 
wholly 
owne. 
R&D 
Financi
ng 
Arrang
ement 
Share 
Issue 
Size Acc 
Perf. 
Concen
-tration 
Leverage Tax 
Status 
 
Intensity 
 
1.000 
        
 
Percent of 
subsidiaries not 
wholly owned 
 
0.076 
 
1.000 
 
       
R&D Financing 
Arrangement 
 
0.353a 0.070 1.000       
 
Share Issue 
 
0.015 
 
0.088 
 
-0.004 
 
1.000 
 
     
Size -0.356a -0.061 -0.268a 0.213a 1.000 
 
    
Accounting 
Performance 
-0.263a -0.016 -0.178b -0.085 0.143 1.000    
Proprietary 
Costs 
-0.098 -0.064 0.029 -0.059 0.263a -0.072 1.000 
 
  
Leverage -0.092 -0.146 0.105 -0.082 0.010 -0.066 0.058 1.000 
 
 
Tax Status 0.381a 0.148 0.269a -0.005 -0.240a -0.342a -0.066 -0.124 1.000 
 
 
a = Significant at the 1 percent level for two-tailed tests. 
b = Significant at the 5 percent level for two-tailed tests. 
 
 
Research Intensity  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/total assets is greater than the median 
value (0.75%), 
Percent of subsidiaries not wholly owned1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned, 
R&D Financing Arrangement  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a R&D financing arrangement in place, 
Share Issue   0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a share issue in 1992 or 1993, 
Size    Market value of equity + book value of debt (current liabilities + long-term debt), 
Accounting Performance Accounting return on assets [operating profit 1993 + (depreciation and 
amortisation)1993- R&D capitalised 1993)]/market value firm 1992, 
Proprietary Costs                                   Market share of the largest competitor in the same industry. 
Leverage    Liabilities/total tangible assets, 
Tax Status   Tax loss component of the future income tax benefit not carried forward/total assets. 
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Table 7 
Logistic Model of Decision to Choose Discretionary Capitalisation 
 
Dependent variable  = 1, if a firm chooses to selectively capitalise R&D costs (n = 67), 
    = 0, if a firm chooses immediate expensing of R&D costs (n = 85). 
 
Variable  Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Significance OLS Results 
T-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
? -1.356 0.703 0.054 1.747 
(0.083) 
Research Intensity  + 1.313 0.422 0.002 3.134 
(0.002) 
Percent of 
subsidiaries not 
wholly owned 
+ 1.817 0.679 0.008 2.814 
(0.006) 
R&D Financing 
Arrangement 
+ 1.081 0.592 0.068 1.733 
(0.085) 
Share Issue + 0.679 0.408 0.096 1.527 
(0.129) 
Size - -0.001 0.001 0.277 -1.004 
(0.317) 
Accounting 
Performance 
- 0.421 0.469 0.370 0.798 
(0.426) 
Proprietary Costs - -1.223 0.861 0.192 -1.362 
(0.175) 
Leverage + 0.434 0.603 0.472 0.601 
(0.549) 
Tax Status - -5.630 
 
2.559 0.028 -2.379 
(0.019) 
                                       Sample size                   n = 152 
                                       Chi-Squared statistic     41.998 
                                       Significance Level         0.0000 
                                       Classification Rate         68.42% 
F = 4.847 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R2 = 
18.7% 
 
Research Intensity    0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/total assets > the median, 
Percent of subsidiaries not wholly owned 1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned, 
R&D Financing Arrangement   0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if a R&D financing arrangement in place, 
Share Issue     0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a share issue in 1992 or 1993, 
Size     Market value of equity + book value of debt, 
Accounting Performance  Accounting return on assets [operating profit 1993 + (depreciation and 
amortisation)1993 – R&D capitalised 1993]/market value firm 1992,  
Proprietary Costs                            Market share of the largest competitor in the same industry, 
Leverage       Liabilities/total tangible assets, 
Tax Status     Tax loss component of future income tax benefit not carried forward/assets. 
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Table 8 
Logistic Model of Decision to Choose Voluntary Disclosure  
 
Dependent Variable = 1, if a firm provides voluntary disclosures about R&D (n = 64), 
    = 0, if mandatory disclosures only about R&D (n = 88). 
 
Variable 
Name 
Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Significance OLS Results 
T-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
? -1.772 0.728 0.015 1.195 
(0.234) 
Research 
Intensity  
+ 2.260 0.454 0.000 5.805 
(0.000) 
Percent of 
subsidiaries 
not wholly 
owned 
+ 0.530 0.613 0.388 0.823 
(0.412) 
R&D 
Financing 
Arrangement 
+ 1.048 0.571 0.066 1.993 
(0.048) 
Share Issue + -0.203 0.417 0.627 -0.431 
(0.667) 
Size + -0.001 0.001 0.907 -0.103 
(0.918) 
Accounting 
Performance 
+ 0.125 0.344 0.716 0.284 
(0.777) 
Proprietary 
Costs 
- 0.202 0.897 0.822 0.171 
(0.865) 
Leverage + -0.047 0.578 0.935 -0.103 
(0.918) 
Tax Status - -2.919 
 
1.802 0.105 -1.907 
(0.059) 
                                        Sample size                   n = 152 
                                       Chi-Squared statistic     46.125 
                                       Significance Level         0.0000 
                                       Classification Rate         73.03% 
F = 6.119 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R2 = 
23.4% 
 
Research Intensity    0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/total assets > the median value, 
Percent of subsidiaries not wholly owned 1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned, 
R&D Financing Arrangement   0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a R&D financing arrangement, 
Share Issue     0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a share issue in 1992 or 1993, 
Size     Market value of equity + book value of debt (current liabilities + long-term debt), 
Accounting Performance   Accounting return on assets, 
Proprietary Costs       Market share of the largest competitor in the same industry, 
Leverage     Liabilities/total tangible assets, 
Tax Status     Tax loss component of future income tax benefit not carried forward/assets. 
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Table 9 
Logistic Model of Decision to Choose Discretionary Capitalisation 
Dependent variable = 1, if a firm chooses to selectively capitalise R&D costs (n = 64), 
 = 0, if a firm chooses immediate expensing of R&D costs (n = 79). 
 
Variable Name Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Significance OLS Results 
T-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
? -1.143 0.739 0.122 2.018 
(0.046) 
Research 
Intensity  
+ 1.409 0.433 0.001 3.339 
(0.001) 
Percent of 
subsidiaries not 
wholly owned 
+ 1.775 0.711 0.013 2.653 
(0.009) 
R&D Financing 
Arrangement 
+ 1.077 0.629 0.087 1.687 
(0.094) 
Share Issue + 0.543 0.422 0.198 1.105 
(0.271) 
Size - -0.001 0.001 0.291 -0.939 
(0.349) 
Accounting 
Performance 
- 0.854 0.705 0.226 1.313 
(0.192) 
Proprietary Costs - -1.228 0.877 0.161 -1.520 
(0.131) 
Leverage + 0.098 0.647 0.879 0.114 
(0.910) 
Tax Status - -4.092 
 
2.494 0.101 -1.754 
(0.082) 
   Sample size                 n = 143 
Chi-Squared statistic   40.006 
 Significance Level       0.0000 
 Classification Rate       71.33% 
F = 4.675 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R2 = 
18.9% 
 
Research Intensity 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/total assets > the median value and 
with the 9 companies omitted that did not disclose amount of R&D costs in any form, 
Percent of subsidiaries not wholly owned1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned, 
R&D Financing Arrangement  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if a R&D financing arrangement in place,  
Share Issue   0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a share issue in 1992 or 1993, 
Size  Market value of equity + book value of debt, 
Accounting Performance Accounting return on assets [operating profit 1993 + (depreciation and amortisation) 
1993- R&D capitalised 1993]/market value firm 1992, 
Proprietary Costs                        Market share of the largest competitor in the same industry, 
Leverage  Liabilities/total tangible assets, 
Tax Status  Tax loss component of future income tax benefit not carried forward/assets. 
 ] 
 
 
 
 27 
Table 10 
Logistic Model of Decision to Choose Voluntary Disclosure  
Dependent Variable = 1, if a firm provides voluntary disclosures about R&D (n = 60), 
 = 0, if mandatory disclosures only about R&D (n = 83). 
 
Variable 
Name 
Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Significance OLS Results 
T-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
? -1.802 0.765 0.019 1.137 
(0.258) 
Research 
Intensity  
+ 2.238 0.465 0.000 5.636 
(0.000) 
Percent of 
subsidiaries 
not wholly 
owned 
+ 1.073 0.671 0.110 1.548 
(0.124) 
R&D 
Financing 
Arrangement 
+ 1.416 0.654 0.030 2.419 
(0.017) 
Share Issue + -0.483 0.446 0.279 -1.005 
(0.317) 
Size + -0.001 0.001 0.871 0.134 
(0.893) 
Accounting 
Performance 
+ 0.148 0.358 0.678 0.372 
(0.711) 
Proprietary 
Costs 
- -0.062 0.933 0.947 -0.110 
(0.912) 
Leverage + 0.228 0.660 0.729 0.332 
(0.740) 
Tax Status - -1.730 
 
1.858 0.352 -1.096 
(0.275) 
   Sample size                  n = 143 
 Chi-Squared statistic     49.709 
Significance Level        0.0000 
  Classification Rate        71.33% 
F = 6.787 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R2 = 
26.8% 
 
Voluntary Disclosure 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there are voluntary disclosures about R&D, i.e., in the director's 
report or the cash flow statement.  Disclosures made in the following notes: accounting policy, 
operating profit and/or intangibles/non-current assets, and income tax are regarded as 
mandatory.  Disclosures need to be provided in four of the possible areas, as well as being a 
‘voluntary disclosure’ to be coded as 1. 
Research Intensity  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 R&D expenditure/total assets > the median value and with the 9 
companies omitted that did not disclose amount of R&D costs in any form, 
Percent of subsidiaries not wholly owned 1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned, 
R&D Financing Arrangement  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a R&D financing arrangement, 
Share Issue  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a share issue in 1992 or 1993, 
Size  Market value of equity + book value of debt (current liabilities + long-term debt), 
Accounting Performance  Accounting return on assets, 
Proprietary Costs                             Market share of the largest competitor in the same industry, 
Leverage             Liabilities/total tangible assets, 
Tax Status  Tax loss component of future income tax benefit not carried forward/assets. 
 
      
 28 
Table 11 
   Multivariate OLS Regression: Discretionary Detail  
     
Discretionary Detail:  Coded on a six point scale depending on the number of areas in the annual report that 
information about R&D is disclosed i.e., summation implies a discrete interval scale for 
disclosures about R&D ranging from 0 to 6. 
 
Variable  Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient T-statistic One-tailed 
Probability 
Intercept 
 
? 1.243 3.054 0.003 
Research 
Intensity 
+ 0.559 7.622     0.000** 
Percent of 
subsidiaries not 
wholly owned 
+ 0.048 0.712 0.478 
R&D Financing 
Arrangement 
+ 0.202 2.848     0.005** 
Share Issue + -0.033 -0.496 0.620 
Size + 0.002 0.022 0.982 
Accounting 
Performance 
+ 0.095 1.357 0.177 
Proprietary Costs - 0.007 0.099 0.921 
Leverage + 0.016 0.230 0.819 
Tax Status - -0.186 
 
-2.515    0.013* 
 
 
Adjusted R2        =     36.7%   F = 10.74 
Two tailed probability     =     0.0000   Durbin-Watson = 1.711 
 
 
 
Research Intensity   0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/total assets > the median value, 
Percent of subsidiaries not wholly owned 1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned, 
R&D Financing Arrangement   0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a R&D financing arrangement, 
Share Issue     0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a share issue in 1992 or 1993, 
Size     Market value of equity + book value of debt (current liabilities + long-term debt), 
Accounting Performance Accounting return on assets [operating profit 1993 + (depreciation and 
amortisation) 1993- R&D capitalised 1993]/market value firm 1992, 
Proprietary Costs                              Market share of the largest competitor in the same industry, 
Leverage                Liabilities/total tangible assets, 
Tax Status     Tax loss component of future income tax benefit not carried forward/assets. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A7.1 
Logistic Model of Decision to Choose Discretionary Capitalisation 
Dependent variable = 1, if a firm chooses to selectively capitalise R&D costs (n = 67), 
 = 0, if a firm chooses immediate expensing of R&D costs (n = 85). 
 
Variable Name Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Significance OLS Results 
T-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
? -0.874 0.659 0.184  2.469 
(0.015) 
Research 
Intensity  
+ 0.741 0.408 0.069 1.638 
(0.104) 
Percent of 
subsidiaries not 
wholly owned 
+ 1.747 0.657 0.008   2.823 
(0.005) 
R&D Financing 
Arrangement 
+ 1.170 0.589 0.047 1.997 
(0.048) 
Share Issue + 0.643 0.398 0.106 1.490 
(0.139) 
Size - -0.001 0.001 0.227  -1.152 
(0.251) 
Accounting 
Performance 
- 0.344 0.448 0.442   0.609 
(0.543) 
Proprietary Costs - -1.215 0.827 0.142 -1.574 
(0.118) 
Leverage + 0.363 0.597 0.543 0.513 
(0.609) 
Tax Status - -4.652 
 
2.386 0.051  -1.926 
(0.056) 
Sample size               n = 152 
Chi-Squared statistic     35.162 
Significance Level        0.0001 
Classification Rate       69.08% 
F = 3.878 
(0.000) 
Adjusted R2 = 
14.6% 
 
Research Intensity  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/total assets > 1.00%, 
Percent of subsidiaries not wholly owned1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned, 
R&D Financing Arrangement  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if a R&D financing arrangement in place,  
Share Issue   0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a share issue in 1992 or 1993, 
Size  Market value of equity + book value of debt, 
Accounting Performance  Accounting return on assets [operating profit 1993 + (depreciation and amortisation) 
 1993- R&D capitalised 1993]/market value firm 1992, 
Proprietary Costs                       Market share of the largest competitor in the same industry, 
Leverage  Liabilities/total tangible assets, 
Tax Status  Tax loss component of future income tax benefit not carried forward/assets. 
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Table A7.2 
Logistic Model of Decision to Choose Discretionary Capitalisation 
 
Dependent variable = 1, if a firm chooses to selectively capitalise R&D costs (n = 61), 
 = 0, if a firm chooses immediate expensing of R&D costs (n = 68). 
 
Variable Name Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Significance OLS Results 
T-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
? -0.157 0.752 0.835  3.213 
(0.002) 
Research 
Intensity  
+ 0.821 0.445 0.065 1.689 
(0.094) 
Percent of 
subsidiaries not 
wholly owned 
+ 1.720 0.747 0.021   2.523 
(0.013) 
R&D Financing 
Arrangement 
+ 1.172 0.641 0.068 1.886 
(0.062) 
Share Issue + 0.323 0.434 0.457 0.517 
(0.606) 
Size - -0.002 0.001 0.177  -1.161 
(0.248) 
Accounting 
Performance 
- 0.779 0.684 0.255   1.130 
(0.261) 
Proprietary Costs - -1.571 0.916 0.086 -1.928 
(0.056) 
Leverage + -0.218 0.676 0.747 -0.310 
(0.757) 
Tax Status - -4.175 
 
2.526 0.098  -1.569 
(0.119) 
   Sample size                  n = 129 
Chi-Squared statistic    33.030 
Significance Level        0.0001 
 Classification Rate        70.54% 
F = 3.552 
(0.001) 
Adjusted R2 = 
15.2% 
 
Research Intensity 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/assets > 1.00% and 0 < 1.00% and > 
0.01%, 
Percent of subsidiaries not wholly owned1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned, 
R&D Financing Arrangement  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if a R&D financing arrangement in place,  
Share Issue    0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a share issue in 1992 or 1993, 
Size   Market value of equity + book value of debt, 
Accounting Performance Accounting return on assets [operating profit 1993 + (depreciation and 
amortisation)1993 – R&D capitalised 1993]/market value firm 1992 , 
Proprietary Costs                     Market share of the largest competitor in the same industry, 
Leverage   Liabilities/total tangible assets, 
Tax Status   Tax loss component of future income tax benefit not carried forward/assets. 
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Table A8.1 
Logistic Model of Decision to Choose Voluntary Disclosure  
Dependent Variable = 1, if a firm provides voluntary disclosures about R&D (n = 64), 
 = 0, if mandatory disclosures only about R&D (n = 88). 
 
Variable 
Name 
Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Significance OLS Results 
T-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
? -0.902 0.634 0.155   2.272 
(0.025) 
Research 
Intensity  
+ 1.341 0.397 0.001   3.515 
(0.001) 
Percent of 
subsidiaries 
not wholly 
owned 
+ 0.516 0.580 0.374 0.864 
(0.389) 
R&D 
Financing 
Arrangement 
+ 1.182 0.562 0.035 2.219 
(0.028) 
Share Issue + -0.177 0.390 0.649 -0.417 
(0.677) 
Size + -0.001 0.001 0.692 -0.370 
(0.712) 
Accounting 
Performance 
+ 0.049 0.339 0.886  0.011 
(0.991) 
Proprietary 
Costs 
- -0.147 0.807 0.856 -0.226 
(0.822) 
Leverage + -0.126 0.556 0.820 -0.280 
(0.780) 
Tax Status - -1.996 
 
1.726 0.248 -1.128 
(0.261) 
Sample size               n = 152 
 Chi-Squared statistic     28.810 
Significance Level        0.0007 
Classification Rate        69.08% 
F = 3.458 
(0.001) 
Adjusted R2 = 
12.8% 
 
Voluntary Disclosure 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there are voluntary disclosures about R&D, i.e., in the director's 
report or the cash flow statement.  Disclosures made in the following notes: accounting policy, 
operating profit and/or intangibles/non-current assets, and income tax are regarded as 
mandatory.  Disclosures need to be provided in four of the possible areas, as well as being a 
‘voluntary disclosure’ to be coded as 1. 
Research Intensity  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/total assets > 1.00%, 
Percent of subsidiaries not wholly owned 1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned, 
R&D Financing Arrangement  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a R&D financing arrangement, 
Share Issue  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a share issue in 1992 or 1993, 
Size  Market value of equity + book value of debt (current liabilities + long-term debt), 
Accounting Performance  Accounting return on assets, 
Proprietary Costs                             Market share of the largest competitor in the same industry, 
Leverage             Liabilities/total tangible assets, 
Tax Status  Tax loss component of future income tax benefit not carried forward/assets. 
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Table A8.2 
Logistic Model of Decision to Choose Voluntary Disclosure  
 
Dependent Variable = 1, if a firm provides voluntary disclosures about R&D (n = 60), 
 = 0, if mandatory disclosures only about R&D (n = 69). 
 
Variable 
Name 
Expected Sign Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Significance OLS Results 
T-statistic 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
 
? -0.585 0.699 0.402   2.423 
(0.017) 
Research 
Intensity  
+ 1.071 0.416 0.010   2.639 
(0.009) 
Percent of 
subsidiaries 
not wholly 
owned 
+ 0.885 0.652 0.175 1.324 
(0.188) 
R&D 
Financing 
Arrangement 
+ 1.505 0.642 0.019 2.461 
(0.015) 
Share Issue + -0.448 0.425 0.292 -1.037 
(0.302) 
Size + -0.001 0.001 0.783 -0.257 
(0.798) 
Accounting 
Performance 
+ 0.051 0.351 0.884  0.094 
(0.925) 
Proprietary 
Costs 
- -0.225 0.860 0.793 -0.347 
(0.730) 
Leverage + -0.081 0.625 0.897 -0.133 
(0.894) 
Tax Status - -1.039 
 
1.787 0.561 -0.509 
(0.612) 
Sample size                 n = 129 
Chi-Squared statistic     25.091 
Significance Level        0.0029 
Classification Rate        65.89% 
F = 2.913 
(0.004) 
Adjusted R2 = 
11.9% 
 
Voluntary Disclosure 0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there are voluntary disclosures about R&D, i.e., in the director's 
report or the cash flow statement.  Disclosures made in the following notes: accounting policy, 
operating profit and/or intangibles/non-current assets, and income tax are regarded as 
mandatory.  Disclosures need to be provided in four of the possible areas, as well as being a 
‘voluntary disclosure’ to be coded as 1. 
Research Intensity  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if R&D expenditure/assets > 1.00% and 0 < 1.00% and > 0.01%, 
Percent of subsidiaries not wholly owned 1 - % subsidiaries wholly owned, 
R&D Financing Arrangement  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a R&D financing arrangement, 
Share Issue  0/1 dummy variable set to 1 if there is a share issue in 1992 or 1993, 
Size  Market value of equity + book value of debt (current liabilities + long-term debt), 
Accounting Performance  Accounting return on assets, 
Proprietary Costs  Market share of the largest competitor in the same industry 
Leverage  Liabilities/total tangible assets, 
Tax Status  Tax loss component of future income tax benefit not carried forward/assets. 
